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Body-Snatching: Medicine and the
Cartesian Threat
Mark D. Sullivan , M.D. , Ph .D.

INT RODUCTION : LESSONS FROM HORROR

Twentieth century physicians are proud to be biolo gical scientists. It is this
feat ure above all others that distinguishes us fr om our p r edecesso rs. Beca use it is
the ba dge of our progress in medicine, biology is often co nsidered the essential
core of medical car e . I nd eed , we can become so focu sed upon th e biology in
medicine that all other aspects of ca r ing for patients fade into a murky
background of ill-d efined sentimentality.
Sometimes it is necessary to look outside of medicin e if we are to reawaken
ourselves to the broader role of medicine in society. One unl ikely but fertil e
source of ins ight about medicine is the classic horror movie Invasion of the Body
Snatchers, made in 19 56 and, to a somewhat lesser exten t, th e 197 8 r em ake of
th is movie. In both of these movies we are presented with the possibility that
those people who we know the best and lo ve the most ma y be imposters. We thus
confront the fear that our intimacy an d affection for th e people closest to us ma y
be for naught. Viewing the movie as physicians, we must co nfront the fact that
"body-snatching" is tak en by all concerned to be a medical probl em .
In these movies body-snatching takes plac e as follows. Ali en s arriving
through 'deep space' from a dy ing planet fall to earth wh ere th ey tak e root and
grow into g iant po ds . While their victim sleeps, a duplicate of th e victim grows
wit hin t he pod. After differentiating into an identical replica of th e human , th e
new bod y awakens from the pod whi le the original body withers away. Having
snatched a body for its use, the alien assumes the roles and re lat io nshi ps of the
person whose body he now inhabits.
The movies begin wit h scattered people co mp laining to som e tr usted
authority (a small-town doctor in the original , a public health field-in vestigato r
in the remake) that t heir lo ved ones are 'd iffe ren t,' that they are no lo nger the
same people. In the original, J im m y Grimaldi co mp lains, " She isn 't m y mot her;
don't let her get me." When Wi lma Lenz is asked how th e new Uncle Ira is
different from the o ld Uncle Ira she replies, " T here is no differen ce you ca n
actually see. He looks, so un ds, acts, and remembers like Uncle Ira. "
In their fear of the body-snatchers, the citizens of Santa Mira mimic a
psyc h iatric syndrome described by the French psychiatrist Capgr as in 1923 (1).
Dr. Sullivan is a third-year resident at the University of Washington , Seattle, Washington.
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T he essen tial featu re of Ca pgras' synd rome is the delusio n o n the part o f th e o ne
afflict ed that persons who are very important and fam iliar to him ha ve be en
replaced by doubles (2). Indeed, th e syndrome so met imes tak es the form wh ere
th e doubles are seen as in vader s fr om outer space (3) . Th is syn drome has al ways
been fou nd in t he co n tex t o f another psychosis, usuall y schizophrenia . It is
d escribed as int ell ectual r ec ognition in th e a bsence of emotional famil iarity
(some wha t th e in verse of deja vu). It ha s been exp lained both ne urophysio logica lly (4) a nd psych odynamically (5). My purpose in this essay is no t to seek a
better ex plana tio n for this syndrome. It is rath er to exa mine the impact of this
threat of th e di ssociation o f intell ect a nd feeling, of body and sou l, upon soc ie ty
and medi cin e as a whole.
For th ose whose bodies have been snatc hed , body and sou l have been
di sconnect ed. Their body no lon ger manifest s th eir so ul's reality. Externa lly,
no th in g is different, wh ile in te rna lly, noth ing is t he same. The appearan ce of
th ese people now belies rather than reveal s th eir reali ty.
This d issociation o f body fr om so ul and ap pearance fro m reality repeats as
d ram a th e ver y situ ation in to whi ch Rene Descartes placed himsel f at the
begin n in g of h is fa mous Meditations. Desca rtes' purpose in these Meditation s was
to di sco ver a sec ure fo u ndat io n up on which a " fir m a nd permanen t structure "
o f scie n t ific knowledge co uld be ba sed. As a fir st ste p toward t h is goal, Descartes
so ug h t to fr ee him sel f of th e scholast icism th at d omi nated the int e llectu a l
cl im ate of hi s d ay. He wanted to make po ssibl e a bod y of na tural sciences
un encumbered b y Aristotelean metaph ysics. To t h is e nd, he sought to " . . .
ser io usly and freel y address m ysel f to th e uph eaval of all my former opinions."
H e thus em p loye d a ' method of d oubt' accordi ng to wh ich he agreed to " . ..
withhold my asse n t from matters whic h are not ent irely certain and indubitable ."
In pursu ing thi s method , Desca rtes did not scrutinize each of h is beli efs
sing ly, "whic h wo uld be a n e nd less u ndertak ing," b u t sought to di sco ver and
d iscard a ll the dubitabl e beli e fs th at underlie our kn owledge . By su bj ecting those
basic beli efs t hat we ta ke most fo r g ra n te d to the most severe doubt possible ,
Descartes so ugh t to find absolutely indubitable bel ie fs to se rve as t he foundati on
fo r hi s edifice of kn owl edge . Ho weve r , to moun t an d sustain such a doubt was no
easy tas k. To p roceed fro m th e possib ilit y that a ny of our beliefs might be false to
th e possibil it y tha t all o ur beli efs m ight be false is an im plau sibl e inferen ce for
wh ich even Descartes had diffi culty providing a reasonable basis: "How are we
to d eny th e obvious wit hou t bein g mad?"
To mak e h is hy pe r bo lic d oubt pla usibl e , Desca rtes postul ated an evil d em o n
wit h th e ca paci ty to se parate ap peara nce from real it y: " I shall then suppose , not
th at God, who is su p re mely good and th e foundati on of tr uth, b ut some evil
ge nius not less power ful than d eceitful , has employed hi s whole energies in
dece iving me . . ." ( I) . T he ev il d em on is th e veh icle by whic h he makes co nc rete
what I will ca ll " t he Cartesia n threat": t hat what we see may te ll us nothin g of
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what truly exists, that the be havio r of others may reveal no thi ng of their true
beliefs.
Insofar as th is threat of universal error applies to o u r kn o wledge of other
people, it is the same threat as that posed b y the body-snatch e rs. Fo r Descar tes
under the method of doubt , as we ll as for those inhabitants o f a wo rld in which
body-snatchers are known to be loose, proofmust preced e tru st. Eac h pe rso n is not
himse lf until he is proven to be. This is a remarkable inversion in both common
se nse and common decency. It is the genius of these movies t hat t hey effectively
dramatize this interpersonal state. By loo king at the Invasion ofthe Body-Snatchers
movies as d ramatizations of the Cartesian threat of uni versal d ece it, p ret e nse
and dissimulation, we will be able to see that this th reat is not merely an
epistemologist's pedantry, but an inchoate evil that haunts o ur dail y lives.
O ppo site this danger lies the safe haven to which we run. In th ese movies
t he Cartesian threat ca lls forth a medica l response. For all th e miracles of
modern medicine, it remains curious that t he dissociation of soul from body is
considered a problem for p hys icians. Pr ecisel y why is th e Cartesian th rea t of
u n ive rsal dissimulation considered a medical problem? Examining this quest io n
will allow us to better understand how the role of medicine in society ex tends
beyond its battle with bacteria, cancer, and heart di sease . We will see how
medicine functions as both defender against th e Cartesian threat a nd as itsel f a
perpetrator of this threat. Throughout, I will focu s specifica lly o n t he Cartesian
dissociation of proof from trust. I will not di scuss Desca rtes' own id eas a bo ut
medicine which have been discussed recently elsewhere (7).
BODY SNATCHING AS THE WORK OF DESCART ES' D EMON

The specia l tal ent of Descartes' demon is to syste ma tica lly d isco n nect
appearance from reality. In our everyday lives we ma y misinte rpret an y gi ven
appearance. We all live with the natural threat of occasional er ror : th at ma y not
be Aunt Betty in the distance but some other wo ma n . T he general and
syste mat ic di ssociation of appearance from reality perpetrated by Descar tes'
demon is a problem not mere ly of greater degree , but of a n e nt ir ely different
kind. After such a d issociaton, evidence leads awa y from rath er th an toward
truth . There remains no reliable means to distinguish mere a ppea ra nce fro m
reality .
In the original movie, the psychiatrist, Dan Kaufman , evo ke s just this sta te
as he admonishes Dr. Bennell after Ben ne ll reports he ha s fo u nd a co py of hi s
friend Jack growing on his bill iard table: "Men, women , and child ren had j ust
discovered that their relatives weren't their re lat ives at all. So yo u r m ind started
playing tricks and rea lity became unreality. The dead man became Jack 's d o ubl e
in yo u r eyes. " He goes on to explain that he is co n vince d Bennell is repo rting
appearance accurately but that it has nothing to do with reality. " It happen ed in
eve ry d etail , but only in yo u r mind." By separating appearance fr om r eal ity the
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demon isolates us in our mind apart from the real world and fr om o ther
people.
Each human has the capacity to dissociate his personal appearance fro m h is
personal reality. That is, each of us can dissemble or dissimulate by hidin g u nde r
a false appearance . This is most obvious in cases of prolonged or e la bo rate d eceit
such as that of a traitor or spy. For these people, loyalty, patriotism, and in d eed
the vast majority of their lives, can become mere appearance.
Two things are unique about this dissociation as it is found in Desca rtes an d
in these movies. First, the Demon and the Body-snatchers impose the d issimulated state. Their victims do not choose to deceive. This produces th e second
unique aspect. Dissimulation ceases to be a specific act and becomes an end uring
state; it becomes the rule rather than the exception in human interaction. In a
way independent of the victim's will, his human body is transform ed in to a huma n
guise. The victim's body is now a mask that conceals rather than rev eals hi s true
nature. Thus sudden and total transformation is new to Dr. Bennell : " In m y
practice I've seen people's humanity drain away , but slowly, not all at o nce."
Once snatched, people are no longer able to express feelings or perhaps even to
have them.
This erosion of trust served Descartes' purposes well. H e hoped to replace
trust with proof in all matters of knowledge. He sought to take nothing for
granted and thereby build a secure foundation for knowledge once and fo r a ll.
Trust, like faith is always vulnerable to doubt and will be systema ticall y
suppressed in a method of doubt.
In the original movie, this erosion of trust produces the rapid e rosio n of th e
community. Objectively, the community is being taken over by aliens in famil ia r
human bodies. This is enough by itself to destroy the most stable of co mm unities. Yet, running before this like a wave through the town is the su bjective sense
of distrust. People cease to rely upon the web of interrelations that hold th e
community together. Neighbors, police, the telephone co m pa ny are successivel y
co-opted. Through all this travail they rely first and last upon th ei r ph ysician .
MEDICINE AS THE DEFENDER AGAINST THE BODY SNATCHERS

At the beginning of the original movie, we se e Dr. Miles Bennell hu r r yin g
back from a medical convention in response to an urgent message fr om h is
nurse. His patients have been demanding to see him for two weeks but won 't tell
anyone else why. There is a rumor about people who believ e their r elatives are
imposters. Upon arriving in town, Dr. Bennell ruminates " . . . e ve ry th in g lo ok ed
the same but wasn 't ... something evil had taken possession o f the town ."
Here at the beginning of the film, so early as to almost escape notice, it is
established that body-snatching is a medical problem. Without an y prompting by
those in authority, the populace decides that this inexplicable transformation in
their loved ones is something to bring to the attention of their fa m ily doctor.
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Eventually a psychiatrist is also consulted, but the clergy are conspicuous in their
absence.
The people of Santa Mira expect Dr. Bennell not onl y to know what to do
for those snatched but a lso to be able to determine who has been snatched and
what that consists of. Becky queries: "What's going on? Mayb e you can tell
me-you're the doctor." That is, he is expected to perform tasks of both
medical therapeutics and diagnosis. In the beginning this presents the difficult
p roblem of determining whether it is the one transformed or the o ne witnessing
the transformation that requ ires treatment. Dr. Bennell chaste ns W ilma Lenz,
"No one cou ld impersonate your Uncle Ira without yo ur seeing a mill io n little
differences. . .. When you see this you will realize th e trouble is insid e you."
The nature of the trouble inside Wilma Lenz or, for that matter, inside her
Uncle Ira, is not immediatel y clear. Wilma could be perceiving t h ings falsely due
to some disorder insid e her mind or Ira could be act ing odd ly d ue to some
disorder ins ide h is body. The problem could be ps ychiatric or medical.
Insofar as the problem is thought to originate in side th e bo dy of those
afflicted it is interpreted as a medical disorder. This is co ns iste n t with co ntemporary medical practice. Problems within society are d eemed medical insofar as
they appear to spring from sources intrinsic to the body.
Since approximately 1800 when autopsy-based clin ico-pathological correlation became the gold standard in medical diagnosi s, th e d esir e to kn ow the
nature of disease has taken the form of a desire to open the body so as to be able
to loo k inside. Thereby, as Michel Foucault explains in his Th e Birth of the Clinic
(8), the physician can directly confront disease with his o wn eyes . Th e lesion
visib le wit hin the patient's body is the now sensible source for th e patien t's
symptoms. The physician no longer need rely solely upon th e patient's report of
his illness; he can open the body and see the disease itsel f. Cirrho sis of th e liver
and emphysema of the lu ngs thus cease to be experien ces o r iginat ing in the
darkness of our bodies, for now they can be directly seen. T h is d esire to open
bodies to get to the bottom of things medical ca n be found in the original
movie.
Miles is called to his friend Jack's house because Jack has di sco vered a body
on his billiard table . Miles is expected to diagnose the situation . Adopti ng the
medical attitude , he rem ar ks that" . .. (the) face is vague ... (t he) body has all its
features but no detai l. It is not a corpse-what els e co u ld it be?" T he bod y is not
alive , but it is not a usual dead body either. The distinctively medical im p ulse of
Dr. Ben ne ll is to open the body to find out what is goin g on. H e checks his
impulse , however , wit h these words. "It sounds crazy, but if! did an au topsy, I'd
find every organ in perfect condition . As perfect as th e body is externally,
everything in working order." Dr. Bennell already se nses, albeit vagu ely, that
body-snatching is not a disease that can be known in th e usu al medical manner.
Bod y-sna tching is a disease of the soul , an organ not easily r eveal ed at a utopsy.
To t he extent that Dr. Be n nell's task of defending th e populace is a task of
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medical diagnosis, he must be able to determine: who is al r eady sna tched? At the
beginning of the movie this consists in determining wh ether it isJi mmy Grimaldi
or his mother who is sick, whether Wilma Lenz or her Uncle Ira has changed. By
the middle of the movie the ta sk simply becomes one of d etermin ing who can be
trusted. One cannot trust the body-snatchers to admit t hat th ey have been
snatched. One cannot r el y upon trust to determine wh en trust is appropriate.
Medical diagnosis, if it is to be useful here , must be abl e to d etermine whether
so meo ne has been snatched or not without relying upon th ei r veracity.
The attempt to know anoth er person in a way immune to that person's
capacity to conceal hi s true thoughts and feelings is di stincti vel y Cartesian . It is
based upon th e idea that to know another we must know th e one inside the body.
One must not trust the body, but rather peel ba ck its covering to confront
directly the feelings in side. The postulated power of Descartes' De mo n means
that behavior ma y tell nothing of belief. In th e presence o f this Demo n- o r the
body-sn atchers-we must assume that th e ap peara nce o f t he other belies his
reality. In order to know the other's ex per ience, th erefore , we must gain an
acce ss to it more immediate and foolproof than hi s o wn words . T he diagnostician of body-snatching must find a way of inferring fr om o u te r behavior to inner
belief that is independent of the will of th e one bein g kn own . As th e p hilosopher
Stanley Cavell has explained, this absolute susp icio n of th e o ther translates into a
temptation to penetrate the other, to look in sid e hi s ex per ience-or his
body-to d etermine wh at is reall y there (9). In its impulse to <'pen the body,
m edicin e seeks to root out th e body sn atch ers and defeat t he Dem o n.
It is likely that all th ese attempts to directl y confr ont th e snatcher's soul
would fail. The in sid e of snatch ed bodies would look as human as their outside
does. Even Dr. Bennell realizes that to open th e body o n J ack 's billiard table
would likely reveal nothing abnormal. We would be ab le 'to see insid e ,' but the
Cartesian impulse to b ypas s th e other in o rder to know him wo uld be thwa rted.
We would not ha ve ach ieved a way of co mpar ing what t he other shows
outwardly with wh at is going on in sid e hi s experien ce . The body wou ld conceal
our true nature no more or less if it co u ld be seen through , if it were completely
tran sparent. It wou ld r emain impossibl e to ac t ua lly get inside another's experie nce through th is window, or to share their sentien ce. Sta n ley Cavell in The
Claim ofReason comments on th e r evelatory pow er of thi s fr ustration:
But if looking insid e might not settle the question whet her the friend
is a human being, why isn 't this more interesting than ever, o r, if you
like , more amazing th an ever? And d oesn 't this at least suggest that we
cannot know that another is se n tient? (5)
This failure is interesting, as Cavell e mp has izes, becau se it teaches us that
our kn o wledge o f ano t her's sentience, of anoth er's humanity, m ust have a
different ba sis than ou r kn owledge o f hi s body. Th e experience of th e patient is
not accessibl e in th e same way that h is body is. T he body can be directly
observed, both in side and out. T he patient ca n always co nceal hi s experience
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from the observing eye. Observation can prove its assertions about th e bod y; the
patient must be trusted to reveal his experience.
MEDICINE AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CARTESIAN THR EAT

In its battle against the body-snatchers, medicine is decisivel y antiCartesian. Dr. Bennell's attempt to identify those wh o have been snatched
means he must joust with the Cartesian d emon. As valiant as he may be in this, he
is doomed to fail. As improbable as th e Cartesian threat of to tal d issimu lation by
a no ther ma y be, once it is establish ed as a real threat, it is impossibl e to d e fea t. If
we must get insid e the o t her's exper ie nce to know him , th e n we will never know
him.
Neverthel ess, throu gh a sub t le modification in th e Cartesian threat, medicine manages to defeat it in real life. Medicine , in th e last ana lysis, a lso seeks to
know the patient by penetrating hi s body. After a co nfusing and u nsu ccessfu l
clinical course, all medi cal eyes turn to the autopsy for answers. Clin icia ns attend
clinicopathological conferences to di scover where th ey went wrong, to discover
what disease was really present. The body is opened a nd th e d isease is revealed.
Dise ase is not only di sco vered but identified and d efined by t his means. A
patient comes to th e ph ysician with a pain or ot her di sability that he is
experiencing. This di sability acquires its identit y as di sease , ho wever, according
to the model of the autopsy, in manner e ntirely independe nt of th e patient's
experience of it. Medicine excludes the patient as se n tie nt in its ultimate
identification and definition of di sease. Medical diagno sis is th us able to
overcome an y shortcomings in th e patient's perception of hi s di sease , whether
these be due to ignorance or deceit. Medicine has achieved a way o f kn o win g its
patients that does not re ly on their truthfulness o r their ca pacity fo r se lfinterpretation .
Medicin e succeeds at this because its goa l is humble r than that of th e
Cartesian. Medicine does not seek a way to ind u bita b ly kn ow the experience of th e
o ther entirel y without hi s coo peratio n as th e Ca rtesian does. Med icine merely
seeks to kn ow th e disease o f th e other independent o f hi s cooperation . It is in th e
distinction between the experience o f th e di sea se and th e di sease itself that th e
ke y to medicine's su ccess in knowing th e o ther lies. Beca use it p ur sues a
mind-independent disease, medicine need not penetrat e th e ex perie nce of th e
other-only his body. Inflamed m eninges and th e infl am ed a p pe nd ix can be
see n and known independentl y of patients' knowledge or interpretation o f
th em. Their primary rea lity is no longer exper ien tial, as mi ght be explored
through dialogue with the patient, but patholo gical , so methi ng e ncountered
through th e autopsy o r o ne of its su rrogates such as x-rays or biopsies.
Thou gh medicine' s response to th e Cartesi an th reat is not itself classicall y
Cartesian , bec au se medicine accepts th e threat as real and o perates as such, it
perpetuates th e power of the Demon. Because ultimate reli an ce upon th e
patient's re port of hi s disease exper ie nce has been re p laced b y t he direct
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encounter of physician and disease at autopsy as the best evi dence for medical
diagnosis, patients' reports receive less attention. They fa ll to the wayside as
incomplete, uninformed , unreliable-as ultimatel y dispensibl e . They ma y be
false through no fault of the patient, or through hi s deliberate d ecept io n if the
patient is malingering. By setting aside the patient's exper ie nce in the u ltimate
definition and identification of disease , medicine, in e ffect, assumes that th e
patient might always be guilty of d ec eit, or more co m mon ly, ignorance.
Medicine thus operates as if Descartes' Demon hovered over th e encounter
between patient and ph ysician, a ll hi s malign power intact. As a pe rpe trato r o f
th e Cartesian threat, medicine is itsel f a body-snatch er. When a patient first
co mes to the doctor, the only awareness of dis ea se presen t is hi s own . Th e
di sorder in his body and his awareness of it are intimately linked. T ogeth e r , t he y
form a disability that disrupts his life . As the ph ysician becomes ac quainted with
th e patient's illness by means of history, ph ysical exa m ina t io n and labo rato ry
tests, it is transformed into disease-something defined bi ologi call y- co mpl etely independent of the patient's awareness of it. T he body afflicte d wit h this
dis ea se has been transported from th e patient's awareness into t hat of medical
professionals, tools, and institutions. The patient's interpretation of his malady
is now superceded by th e medical interpretation . T his sickness is now d e fined
and identified within a medical awareness that is no longe r hi s o wn . H is bod y has
been snatched.
CO NCL USIO N: SNATCHING BODIES BACK

There is no hope offered that th e cit ize ns of Santa Mira mi gh t find a way to
snatc h th eir bodies back from the ali ens. But in rea l life th ere is hope that we
ma y be abl e to snatch our bodies ba ck from co ntempo ra ry medicine.
Th e recently elaborated di stinction between di sease and illn ess should help
us understand how this might occu r. Eric Cassell , a refl ect ive in tern ist , has
d escribed illness as " what the patient feels wh en he goes to th e d octor ," and
di sease as " .. . what he has on th e way home from th e d o ct or's o ffice. Disease,
th en, is something an organ has; illn ess is something a man has" (6). Arthur
Kleinman, a psychiatrist a nd anth ropo log ist , explains th at sickness is initia lly
expe r ie nce d b y patients as illn ess: " . . . the life concerns a nd problems that it
presents for common sense understanding as part of th e every d ay wo rl d of th e
sick person." Biomedical dis ea se, on the other hand , is th e " . . . mech anica l
break down or disruption in biological structures and function s" ( 10). T hus,
disease is a way of characterizing bodily disorder in a way independen t of th e
patient's awareness of it. Disease is defined and identified independent of t he
patient's capacity for self-in ter p reta tio n; it is mind-independent. Illness is
mind-dependent with respect to the patient. Illness is d efined a nd identified b y
means of the patient's capacity for se lf-inter p reta t io n .
As the autopsy be came incorporated into clinical medicine in th e nine-
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teenth century and clinicopathological correlation became th e fina l word in
knowing disease, it became possib le to define " d isease " in a man ner independent of illness. At some point in the contemporary e nco u n te r between d octo r
and patie n t , a backache with fever that prevents a moth er from going to her
son's graduation beco mes pyel o nep h ri t is, an infection in her kidney. It is in th is
transformation from having an illness to having a dis ease that o ne's sickness and
one's body are snatched.
There are many benefits to ha ving one's sickness sna tc hed. Transported
into the te chnologically supported system of medical awa reness, sickness is more
like ly to be cured. As has been well-documented , however, bei ng plugged into
th is system can be intensely dehumanizing. The technologica l imperatives o f
modern medicine are diverse and powerful. The y have altered th e nature o f
birth and death in our society. Medicine assuages our fear of di sease by giving us
somewhere to go, something to do. But its priorities are not always o ur own .
So metimes it seems as if we must give up control of our lives in o rder to save
them . In te nsive-care nurses are often the first to sa y that th ey would never be a
patient in one of the u n its where they work.
H ig h-tech medicine is accepted as having many negati ve side-effects. What
is less accepted is that an exclusive focu s on the biological and chem ica l ma y not
be the most effective means of dealing with disability, ma y not be th e best way to
get medicine's main job done. Isolation of biolo gical factors from others
relevant to healing ca n be detrimental to th e e fficie ncy and e ffective ness o f
medicine. This is especially true in the case of chronic di seases suc h as d iabetes
where good care requires active patient participation. It is a lso true in those
common situations where primary care physicians co nfr o n t so ma t ic eq uiva lents
of depression or anxiety in their patients. The relentless " r ule out" of o rgan ic
causes in these situations can be wasteful (e .g ., coronary arteriogram s for pan ic
disorder) or even mi sleading (e.g., the silent gall stone seen as ca use for
functional a bd o m ina l pain).
This debate is far beyond m y sco pe here . I will j us t mention in passing th at
at issue here is the very identity of medicine as a scie nce. Is medicine a pure ly
natural science which limits its concern to di sordered biology? Or is it more
effectively seen as a human or social scie nce which fundam entall y ad dresses th e
experience of disabi lity? A move from the former to th e latter will be necessar y if
medicine's body-snatching propensities are to be cu r bed .
The fears of t he people of Santa Mira as the body-snatchers begin to take
over are fears we each kno w too well. These very worldly fears include the fear
of isolation , of so litude, of non-communication. They also include fears o f
revealing oneself and, perhaps more poignantl y, of bein g un abl e to reveal
oneself. Notably, these are the same fears sickness imposes on us. Eac h of us fears
death, and perhaps more so , the dis ease and pain that will precede it. Bu t even
when this fate is accepted, the fear of d ying alone r emains almost u ni versal. T o
face horrible pain tota lly alone, to pa ss from life without a whis per of concern
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from another, these are dire prospect s even a fter one has accep te d the inevitability of death itself. Those who care for us in sickness must respond to this threat
of isolation as well as th e threat of death .
If our soj o u rn with the body-snatchers has taught us anything about
Cartesianism in medicine, it is that th e relation betwee n sou l and bod y within
modern medicine must be understood in terms o f th e d ynami cs of proof and
trust between doctor and patient. I have addressed this issue in more detail
elsewhere (11). For now , it must suffice for us to understand slig htly better how
proof and trust in medicine help us face death .
Proven knowledge is secu re knowledge. It stands firml y in th e face of death.
When isolating the cause of biological death we want to be sure of what we know.
The stakes are too high to accept anything less. We seek to d en y d eath its power
not only over our bodies, but over our knowledge as well. T he Cartesia n canons
of proof were designed to produce knowledge that would esca pe d eath .
Trust is a basis for knowledge that accepts its limits in a way th at proo f does
not. Always founded upon uncertainty, it accepts the finitude o f ou r kn o wing.
Trust shares our fear of death : that all will not be finished , complete , or sure
when we die.
Clearly, both proof and trust have a role in th e doct or-patient rel atio nsh ip
and in medicine as a whole. We expect the scien tific physician to pu rsue
knowledge of our sickness with a rigor commensurate with th e hi ghest standards
of proof. We also expect that we will be able to share our ex perience of sickness
with our physician even though nothing about it ca n be d efinitivel y p ro ved . It is
this experience that first brings th e patient to his physician. Fr om t he patient's
point of view it is the sine qua non o f medicine.
In a relatively sho r t time m edicine has acquired immensel y powe r ful tools
for diagnosis. Now it must employ those tools in a way that do es not deny
patients' se ntie nce. The people of Santa Mira would unde rstand o nly too well
this ne ed to have one's ex iste nc e and exper ie nc e co nfir med by o ther humans.
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